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I.

Introduction

"Greed, for lack ofa better word, is good. Greed is right. Greed works. Greed clarifies,
cuts through, and captures, the essence of the evolutionary spirit. Greed, in all of its forms; greed

for life, for money, for love, knowledge, has marked the upward surge of mankind and greed,
you mark my words, will not only save Teldar Paper, but that other malfunctioning corporation
called the

U.S.A.'I

These words were uttered by the infamous Gordon Gekko in the 1987

motion picture Wall Street which illustrated an environment that insider trading regulation was
meant to remedy. Greed can, in short, make one do whatever it takes to get whatever one seeks.

But that greed, when seen not at an individual level, but on a market wide level has the capacity
to wreak havoc on the economy.
One of the biggest issues with insider trading is that it disrupts economic efficiency

in

terms of information availability.2 In an efficienl market, the stock price of a given company

will

be an accurale reflection of its lrue underlying value.s In rum. the accurate reflection gives

investors the tools to make a wise investment decisiona. On the contrary, ifthe stock price given
is an inaccurate reflection of the true underlying value

ofthe security, investors in tum will not

be able to make an informed decision when deciding what investments to invest in.s Thus an

inef{icient use of capital results.
Inaccurate stock prices also create societal costs. "When companies raise capital at
inaccurate prices, existing shareholders derive gains to the extent that new investors overpay for

1

Memorqble Quotes For woll Street,lMDB.com, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0094291/quotes (last visited March
12,20721.
'?Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Ma*et Efliciency, T0 Va. L. Rev. 549, 593 (1984).
3
Marcel Kahan, Secuities Laws and the Social Costs of'lnaccurate" Stock Pices, 41 Duke L.J. 977, 1006 (1992).
o

'

td.
td.

their shares, and suffer losses to the extent that new investors underpay."6 This disparity
between market value and actual value results in an inefficient allocation of capital and

fi.rthermore a decrease in the quality of projects funded by organizalions.T

"lfby issuing overpriced securities a corporation will obtain benefits for existing shareholders that exceed
the losses from a project, the company will proceed to raise capital for an unprofitable project. Likewise, a
corporation will re&ain fiom issuing secwities for a profitable project ifthe losses from selling those shares
at a bargain price will exceed the projecfs profits.""
On the conhary, when stock prices accurately reflect the underlying value of a security, "new

investors pay exactly what the shares are worth and are able to evaluate their investment
decisions on the merits."e This is the only way to preserve the efficient use of capital in the
marketplace.lo

Aside fiom economic inefficiencies, insider trading also carries with it an inherent sense
of unfairness.l

I

This unfaimess has more or less fueled the rules and regulations that have come

about through legislative as well

as

judicial action. The history of securities regulation can be

taced to the 1933 Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which were passed
during the Great Depression.
"The Securities Act aims to protect puchasers of newly offered securities by requiring issuers to disclose
information about their business, property, management, financial attributes, outlook and risk potential.
The Exchange Act encompasses a series ofregulations applying primarily to issuers and previously
outstanding securities trading in secondary markets such as the NYSE and the NASDAQ.
The Exchange Act seeks to ensure the integfity ofthe market through its antifraud and antimanipulation

provisions."l2

" ld.
7
3

ond the Sociol costs of "tnaccurate" Stock Prices, 4I Duke L.J. 97?,1006 (1992).
Jonn R. Beeson, RoundingThe Peg to Fitthe Hote: A Proposed Regulatory Reform ofthe Misoppropriotion Theory,
Marcel Kahan,

Sec urities Lows

144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1077, 1090-1091 (1996).

sJonn

R. Beeson, RoundingThe Peg to Fitthe Hole: A Proposed Regulqtory Reform ofthe Misoppropriation Theory,
144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1077, 1090-1091 (1996).
10
Marcel Kahan, Secutities Laws and the Sociat Costs of "lnaccunte" Stock Pices, 41 Duke L.J. 977, 1006 (1992).
11
Jonn R. Beeson, R ounding The Peg to Fit the Hole: A Proposed Regulotory Relorm ot' the Misdppropriqtion
Theory, 744 U. Pa. L. Rev. LO77, 7097 179961.
" 50 N.J. Prac., Business Law Deskbook I29:2 (2011-2012 ed.)

Although both acts seek to level the playing field amongst investors ofall kinds, neither act
outlaws the practice ofinsider trading. While mentioned in sections 16(b)t3,20(a)t4 and21(a)t5

of the Exchange Act, the courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission have agreed that
insider trading is encompassed within Rule 10b-5 in section l01b) of the Exchange Act.16

Rule 10b-5,lT "promulgated by the SEC in 1942 as an exercise of the rulemaking power
granted by section

l0(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act")," is the "basic

federal antifraud provision used to regulate the securities markets."l8 The legislative history for

Rule 10b-5 is limited and thus the Courts have mainly been the driving force in developing the
scope of

liability that the rule intends to impose.le

13

section 16(b) requires statutory insiders (directors, officers and 10% shareholders of the corporation) to
disgorge any proflts earned through short-term trading which is a period of six months. Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 s 16(b), 15 U.5.C. s 78p(b) (1994).
Regarding short term swing profits, liability is not based on the use of inside information but rather the timing of
that use. A trade conducted within six months of another trade is a violation and in turn any profits reaped must
be disgorged. On the other hand, an insider whose trades are separated by more than the statutory six-month
period does not violate section 16 even if that trade was based on inside information. lnsider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 s 16(b), 15 U.S.C. s 78p(b) (1994).
to

"section 2OA provides private rights of action based on contemporaneous trading between an insider and
another trader." lnsider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of l9SS s 20A, 15U.S.C.s78t-1 (1994).
lssection

21A provides the SEC with the authority to bring an action for civil penalties against anyone who engages
in insider trading. Insider Tra ding and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 s20A, 15 U.S.C. s78u-1(a)(1XA)
(1994). Similarto "section 20A, section 2lAdoes not make insider trading illegal nor does it explicitly define
insider trading. Instead, section 21A merely addresses the SEC's ability to impose civil penalties on inside traders."
See Beeson, supra note 8, at 1102.
tu

t'

See Beeson, supra note 8, at 1104.
Rule 1ob-5 of the security and Exchange Act states:

"lt shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
{b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light ofthe circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. s 240.10b-5 (1995).
18
Donald c. Langevoort, Fraud and Deception By securities Professionals, 61 Tex- L. Rev. 7247,1292 (1983)
t"
see Eeeson, supra note 8, at 1L07

II.

The Classical Insider Theory

Judicial interpretation regarding l0b-5 has drastically broadened its reach in terms of
culpability over time. Originally, the basis for liability under Rule 10b-5 was founded upon
common law notions of fraud which focused on a duty to speak which came about through
certain fiduciary duties. The fiduciary relationships mainly arose within the context

of

traditional insiders who were directors. officers. and controlline shareholders.2o Hence at
common law,
"silence regarding facts that were not available to another party was nol considered fraud unless the first
party had a duty to speak that arose out of a special relationship or unless otler sp€cial facts were
present. Accordingly, courts traditionally required a breach ofa fiduciary duty or similar relationship
before liability for trading on the basis of material nonpublic information would attach. Strict adherence to
such a requirement, however, would allow outsiders who have no fiduciary duty or relationship oftrust that
extends to the corporation to trade in the market on material nonpublic information,"2r

The traditional definition

ofa corporate insider within l0b-5 was first expanded in the decision

of In Re Cady, Roberts & Co. ("Cady").
"On November 25, 1959, the Board ofthe Cuftiss-Wright Corporation met to set the fouth-quarter
dividend for the year. During the first thee quarters the Board had declared a $0.625 dividend, but decided
that the fourth-quarter dividend should be reduced to $0.375. At approximately 1l:00 a.m., the Board
approved disclosure ofthe dividend to the New York Stock Exchange, but there was a delay in nansmitting
the information due to a q?ing problem. The announcement did not appear on the Dow Jones ticker tape
until I l:48 a.m. and was not delivered to the Exchange until 12:29 p.m. During a recess ofthe Board
meeting, and pdor to Dow Jones's receipl ofthe information, J. Cheever Cowdin, a Curtiss-Wright director,
notified Robert Gintel, a broker at Cady, Roberts & Co., that the Board had cut the dividend. Prior to the
dissemination ofthe news to the public, Gintel sold 7000 shares of Cuniss-Wright Stock."22

If applying the cornmon law notions of Rule l0b-5 in terms of traditional fiduciary
relationships which give rise to a duty to speak, Gintel in this instance would escape

liability-he

would not be considered an insider (director, officer, or confiolling shareholder) and thus would
not be held liable for his actions of trading on nonpublic material information. The Court saw
the discrepancy and found Gintel to have violated l0b-5 even though he was not considered a

traditional insider per the corrunon law understandins. The court stated:
20

Exchange Act s 16(b), 15 U.S.C. s 78p(a) (1994).

" See Eeeson, supta note 8, at 1083-1084
" see id. at 1LL0.

"We have already noted that anti-fraud provisions are phrased in terms of"any person" and that a special
obligation has been traditionally required of corporate insiders, e.g., oflicers, directors and controlling
stockholders. These tbree groups, how€ver, do not exhaust the classes ofpersons upon whom there is such
an

obligation"."

As a result the court adopted the "disclose or abstain rule"
which based an individual's duty to disclose material nonpublic information prior to ftading on two
elements: (l) a relationship between the trader and the inside source ofthe information such that the
information is intended only for a corporate purpose and not for the insider's own benefit; and (2) the
inherent unfairness ofthe trader taking advantage ofthat information knowing that it is unavailable to
others in the market.

2a

Based upon the rule adopted, liability under Rule 10b-5 could be established when an

investor leams of material nonpublic information, intended not for his benefit but for a corporate
purpose, and trades based upon that information before
ensue even

if

disclosue. Liability thereby would

the investor was not a statutory insider. Thus in this instance Gintel would be held

in violation of the disclose or abstain rule uaopt"a."
Cady not only introduced an attempt by the court to expand the interpretation of 10b-5 to
encomp:rss more wrongdoers

within its breath, but it also infused

a faimess element

into the rule

which the court deemed inherent within Rule 10b-5's spirit. "The faimess theory of Cady fnds
its rationale in the goal of achieving a sense of integrity and faimess in the market which is not
possible if the system tolerates transactions in which one party has inside information
unavailable to the other."26
The disclose or abstain rule adopted in Cady was further expanded in SEC v. Texas

Sulphur

Co.

Gulf

In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, Texas Gulf Sulphur ("TGS"), a mining company,

had been conducting geophysical surveys in eastem Canada for a number of years.2? In

November of 1963, a test hole, K-55-1, produced indications of very high concentrations

2t

see Beeson, supra note 8, at 1111.

2o

,ee td.

"

see ld,
5ee Io.

27

Sec.

& Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulohur Co.. 401 F.2d 833, 843 (2d Cir. 1968).

of

copper, zinc, and silver.28 It was ultimately determined that the area had one of the largest
copper and zinc deposits in North America.2e The geological team involved in the expedition
was told, by the company President, to keep the results

ofthe core deposits confidential from all

others in the corporation as well as the public.30 Before TGS released the news of the strike to
the public, various employees including the four geological team members along with the
President and Executive Vice President had bought TGS stock and call options based upon their
successful frndings.3r After the findings were released to the public, TGS's stock price more
than tripled.32 In tum, each of the employees who had bought stock in the company heavily

profited from their investments.
To determine liability, the Court used the "disclose or abstain rule" established in Cady
and applied

it to'anyone in possession of material information."ls Therefore, "if

a trader in

possession of material inside information is precluded from disclosure due to a corporate

confidence or simply chooses not to disclose, he must abstain from kading."3a The Court's
declaration has the effect of including anyone within a firm with material inside information

within the confines of Rule

1

0b-5

.

For example, an insider would now include

aj

anitor who

finds a sensitive document in a garbage can and decides to trade upon the information obtained.

In ZGS, the court applied the classical insider definition to not only the President and Executive
Vice President, but also to the four geologists who were part ofthe team and who had bought

28

see ld.
see td. ot 850.
30
see td. ot 84g
31
see ld. ot 844
32
see td. ot 847
33
see td. at 848
'o see Beeson, supra note 8, at 1112
2s

call options before the news was public knowledge. The disclose or abstain rule as introduced in
Cady was now applied and broadened through the holding in TGS.ls

III.

The Evolution of the Classical Insider Theory

The early cases interpreting Rule 10b-5 such as Cady and ZGS provided a foundation on

which later Courts could build a framework for a comprehensive insider trading theory'36
Chiarella v. United States "provided the first girder in this framework." Vincent Chiarella was
employed by Pandick Press, a financial printing company.lT Through his employment, he had
access to confidential information regarding tender offers which was nonpublic

information.3s Pandick Press' core competency was printing financial documents for its clients.
Usually, offering companies would bring documents to Pandick for printing in preparation of
discloswe to tl-re public.3e Chiarella was in charge of conducting the printing. For tender offers,
the offering company blanked out the target corporations for confidentiality purposes.40 Despite

their efforts, Chiarella was able to determine the identities ofthe target corporations before they
were publicly disclosed.ar In five instances, Chiarella made trades in the stock of the target

corporation, without disclosure, before the news of the tender offer or merger was announced.42

As a result of his trades, Chiarella was able to obtain in excess of$30,000 in profits.a3
As Chiarella was in no way related to the taxget corporations which he was able to
decipher, Chiarella would be considered an outsider trading on nonpublic material information.
He had no relationship with the target company as he was hired by the acquiring company.

"36 See Beeson, supra note 8, at 1112
see td.

at LLL6.
v. U. s., 445 U.5.222,224 (1980).

"38 Chiorello
see ld,

-- See ld.
>ee tq.
ot

see ld.
o'
see td.
>ee tq.

Hence no special relationship or duty under any legal theory arose between the target company
and Chiarella. The Supreme Court, adhering to a traditional notion of insider trading, held that
"when an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to

speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under $ 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession

of

nonpublic market information."a Because Chiarella had no special relationship with the target
corporations in terms ofhistorical dealings, his trading upon the nonpublic information without
disclosure did not constitute fraud.

as

The Court also deemed the classical insider theory per ZGS inapplicable as Chiarella was
not an employee ofthe company upon which he traded upon.
"Furthermore, the Court narrowly defined the analysis of Cady to requte a breach of a fiduciary duty or
similar relationship oftrust and confidence by a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and
confidence to support liability. Therefore, one with no defined duty has no duty to disclose or abstain from
trading material nonpublic information." ""

Based upon this limitation introduced by the court, there appeared to be an inherent gap

within

10b-5. The fact that Chiaretla was able to escape liability did not sit well with many.

IV.

The Tipper/Tippee Theory

The inherent faimess in trading emphasized in Cady wasbeing circumvented by the

fiduciary duty requirement. This void was eventually addressed in SEC v- Dirfu where the Court
added tipper/tippee liability when construing Rule l0b-5.

Raymond Dirks was an officer of Delafield Childs, Inc., a New York registered brokerdealer firm serving institutional investors.4T In early 1973, Ronald Secrist was fired from
as an

officer at Bankers National,

a

hisjob

New Jersey life insurance co-palty.oE Four years earlier,

Bankers National had been acquired by Equity Funding of America, a diversified company

*
4s

*

see Chiorello, supra note 37, at 235.
see

ld. at 242.

see Beeson, supra note 8, at 1119
47
Dirks v. s.E.C.,463 U.S. 646, 646 (1983).
>ee tq.

selling primarily life insurance and mutual funds.ae Shortly after being fired, Secrist called Dirks

to inform him that Equity Funding had vastly overstated its assets as a result of several
fraudulent corporate practic"r.'o H" investigated the allegations and came to the conclusion that

fraudwasbeingperpetratedatEquityFunding.srDirksdiscussedtheinvestigationandhis
findings with anyone who asked.52 As a result of speaking with Dirks, several investors quickly
began selling their investments in Equity Funding stock, before the New York Stock Exchange

halted trading on Equity Funding.sr The SEC eventually found that fraud was being perpetrated.
Nevertheless, the SEC charged and convicted Dirks ofviolations of the antifraud provisions

of

the securities laws for disclosing information from his investigation to investors.sa
The Supreme Court in Dirfu began by reaffirming the Chiarella holding, which limited
the scope of Rule l0b-5 to instances involving the breach of a fiduciary duty or other special
relationship oftrust and confidence. The court stated there is no duty to disclose when the
person who traded, "was not the corporation's agent, . . . was not a fiduciary, or was not a person

in whom the sellers . . . had placed their trust and confidence."ss The Court then broadened

liability for recipients of material nonpublic information by including tippees who receive
information improperly or for a confidential purpose.56 To determine whether
obtained information improperly, the Court adopted a two prong test.57

ae

so

5t
52

See Dfks, supra note 46, at 646.

Dirks,463 u.s. at 649
see ld.

see ld.

t' Dirks,463
s see td.
tt

s6

u.s. at 646

Dirks,463 u.s. at 654
Dirks,463 u.s. at 660
see to.

10

a

tippee has

First, the insider (i.e. Tipper) must have breached a fiduciary duty to the shareholders rn
disclosing the information to the tippee.58 This disclosure is considered a breach of fiduciary
duty when the tipper makes the disclosure for a direct, or indirect, personal benefit.se This
personal benefit includes either "pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that

will translate into

future eamings."60 Second, the tippee will be subject to a duty to disclose or abstain only if he is
aware, or reasonably should be aware,

ofthe insider's breach.u' B.caus" of the awareness

requirement, the Tippee's liability is derivative of the tipper's liability. Ifthe Tipper is found not

to be liable, then the tippee is automatically exonerated from liability.
The Court held that because Secrist had not given Dirks the information for pecuniary
gain, but merely to expose the fraud occuning at Equity Funding, he didn't meet the first prong

ofthe newly adopted test.62 Because tippee liability is derivative of the tipper's liability, the
court concluded that Dirks did not inherit a fiduciary duty since Secrist did not receive any
personal benefit from divulging the information.
Through the Dlr&s court, 10b-5's scope expanded to "tippees who facilitate a fraud after
an insider's breach."63 The court in Dir,ts further expanded

liability to an additional group of

tippees known as "constructive insiders." These are insiders who have received information

for

a corporate purpose.
"Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed legitimately to an
underwriter, accountant, larryer, or consultanl working for the corporation, these outsiders may become
fiduciaries ofthe shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons
acquired nonpublic corporate infomation, but rather that they have entered into a special confidential
relationship in the conduct ofthe business ofthe enterprise and are given access to information solely for
corporate purposes."s

sB

'"
@

61

u'

See Dirks, supra note 55, at 650.
see td.

see td.
see ld.

Dirks,463 u.s. at 666.

"t see Beeson, supra note 8, at

*

1122.

oirks, q63 u.s. at 655 n.14.
11

Through its interpretation of "constructive insiders," the court again sought to "expand liability
beyond traditional corporate insiders and include those who technically do not inherit a fiduciary
duty since none truly exists between the constructive insiders and the corporate shareholders."65

V,

The Misappropriation Theory

Up to this point, based upon all of the case law discussed, the court has based insider

trading regulation on determining whether a fiduciary relationship was owed and whether that
relationship was violated in a particular scenario. This structure has been expanded and
constricted, but the court's central concem in all ofthe cases was focused on the insider who
owed a frduciary duty to a source. What the courts have not addressed is the trading

of

nonpublic material information by outsiders who do not breach a duty to the corporation in
which they trade.66 The inherent unfaimess of a trader who takes advantage of this nonpublic
information, a major concem in Cady, thus was the driving force for a new legal theory in insider
trading regulation-the misappropriation theory67.
The misappropriation theory was introduced to remedy the perception of injustice

resulting from a "failure of the securities laws to encompass all trading on material nonpublic

information."68 The theory gained headway through the decision in SEC v. Materia which posed
similar facts as those in Chiarella discussed above. In,SEC v. Materia, Materia was employed
by a financial printer but was a "copyholder" who read drafts ofprospectuses and other financial
documents aloud to a proofreader who would then check the drafts against the copy obtained

"'
66

See Beeson. supra

note 8, at 1122.

see ld. at L724.
see ld.
a Ronald F. Kidd, tnsider Trading: The Misappropriation Theoty Vesus an "Access to lnfotmation" Perspective, 18
Del. J. Corp. L. 101, 117 0993).
67

from the client.6n ln cases involving tender offers, the names of the target companies were
omitted.To Nevertheless, Materia was able to make out four tender offer targets based upon his
knowledge in the field and the general business environment.Tr Using this information. Materia
purchased stock in the target companies before the tender offers were publicly disclosed.?2

Within days of the public announcements, he sold his holdings for significant gains.i3
Applying the fiduciary duty requirement proclaimed in Chiarella or Dirk's constructive
insider theory in this matter, Materia would escape liability. Chiarella rcasoned that 10b-5 is

only applicable to an insider who owes a fiduciary duty.Ta Furthermore, using Dir*'s
constructive insider theory, an outsider who is hired by a company and learns of material

nonpublic information will be considered only a fiduciary to the hiring corporation's
shareholders.T5 In either case though, a fiduciary relationship is not established between the

outsider and the shareholders ofthe target corporation within a tender offer situation. Hence, an
inherent unfaimess results if the outsider is freely able to trade upon information which involves
a target

breach

corporation. The court stated that "one who misappropriates nonpublic information in

ofa fiduciary duty

and trades on that information to his own advantage violates Section

10(b) and Rule 10b-5.-76 The court stated that by Materia misappropriating information from his

employer, he "perpetrated a fraud" which gave rise to a duty to refrain from trading.TT

"e

sEc v. Moterio, T4sF.2d 197,199 (2d

'o Moterio,745 F.2d
see td.

t'

12

7t
la

cir. t9g4).

al1gg.

see ld.
see ld.

See Chiarella, supra note 37, at 235

"16 Dirks,463

u.s. at 6s5 n.14.

Materio,745 F.2d al213.
71
Materia,745 F.2d at2o2.
13

The misappropriation theory was again appliedin United States v. O'Hagan. O'Hagan
was a partner in the law

firm of Dorsey & Whitney.T8 Grand Metropolitan PLC (Grand Met),

a

company based in London, England, retained Dorsey & Whitney as local counsel to represent
Grand Met regarding a potential tender offer for the common stock of the Pillsbury Company.Te

O'Hagan did no work on the Grand Met representation but was told of the proposed tender offer
by ajunior partner on the account.80 Upon leaming ofthe tender offer, O'Hagan bought 2500
call options for Pillsbury, the target corporation.8l A month later, Grand Met publicly announced
its offer to buyout Pillsbwy.82 O'Hagan exercised his options and made a profit of 4.3 million

dollars.8r The court expiained that the
"misappropriation theory holds that a person commits fiaud in connection with a securities transaction, and
thereby violates $10ft) and Rule l0b-5, when he misappropriates confidenlial information for securities
trading purposes, in breach ofa duty owed to tlre source ofthe information. Under this theory, a fiduciary's
undisclosed, self-serving use ola principal's information to purchase or sell securities, in breach ofa duty
ofloyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal ofthe exclusive use ofthat information. In lieu of
premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between company insider and purchaser or seller ofthe
companys stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary tumed trader's deception of
thosi who enrrusted him with access to confidential information."8a

Thus

ifA

owes a special duty of trust or confidence to the "source"

ofthe information

and uses

the information to trade without disclosure, A is deemed a misappropriator. A nexus of the
relationship between A's duty to the source and the corporation whose stock is traded need not
be established.8s In this situation, O'Hagan owed a special duty to the law firm which employed

him. The law firm in this

case is the source of the

information.tu when o'Hagan secretly took

'" u.s. ,. o'Hagan,52r u.s.642,647 (79971'" o'Hogon,521 U.s at 547.
&
see ld.

"' see ld,
"2 see ld,
83

u

see ld.

O'Hdgon,52LU.5 ar 652.
3s
2 James D. cox, Treatise on the Law of corporations 5 12:10 (3d ed. 2011).
"" o'Hogon,52L U.s at 685

the information ofthe tender offer and purchased call options, he breached his fiduciary duty to
the source ofthe information.8T Hence he misappropriated the information.E8
The courts have struggled in determining how to define the "special duty of trust or
confidence to a source of the information" when applying the misappropriation theory.

ln United

States v. Chestmanthe court broadly expanded the frduciary relationship to not only

employment relationships, but any relationship based on "trust and confidence."8e Ira Waldbaum
was the controlling shareholder of a large supermarket chain named Waldbaum, lnc.90 Ira told

his sisteq Shirley Witkin, three ofhis children, and a nephew that he had agreed to sell the
corporation to Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Inc. ("A & P"), but cautioned them to
keep the news confidential.er Shirley

Witkin in tum told her daughter, who then told her

husband, Keith Loeb.e2 Loeb then told Robert Chestman who was a broker who traded on the

nonpublic information about the tender offer.e3
The court explained that Chestman's convictions under Rule 10b-5 could not be sustained
unless "(1) Keith Loeb breached a duty owed to the Waldbaum family or Susan Loeb based on a

fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence, and (2) Chestman knew that Loeb had
done so."ea The court found that a familial relationship is not dispositive of the trust and

confidence requirement.es Instead more facts have to be presented to show that the relationship
was one based on trust and confidence.e6 The court found that this was not shown and hence
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held that the Loeb or Chestman were not liable for trading on nonpublic information. Based
upon its holding, the court implicitly declared
"that where any fiduciary relationship existed, the misappropriation theory could be applied. Accordingly,
under the misappropriation theory after Chestman there was no requirement that (1) the 'buyer or seller of
securities be dellauded' or (2) the fiduciary duty be limited to the 'confined sphere of fiduciary/shareholder
relanons-

The expansive fiduciary relationships for misappropriation purposes was exemplified

further in United States v. Willis where abreach in a doctor patient relationship was grounds to
hold the trader (the doctor) liable as a misappropriator.e8 Sanford I. Weill was CEO of Shearson
Loeb Rhodes but had eventually sold his controlling interest to the American Express Company
and in tum became its President.ee He later expressed interest in becoming CEO

of

BankAmerica and successfully secured an investment from Shearson in the amount of 1 billion
dollars if he became CEO.r00 Weill would occasionally tell his wife, Joan Weill of these
endeavors.lol At the time, Joan Weill was seeing a psychiatrist, Robert Willis.lo2 Mrs. Weill told
Dr. Willis both about her husband's efforts to become CEO of BankAmerica and about the
investment.r03 Upon hearing this, and prior to the information becoming public, Dr.

Willis

purchased 13,000 shares of BankAmerica.lk After a public announcement was made of Weill's
desire to be CEO, Dr.

Willis sold his

shares at a

profit of $27,475.1os

The court held that the relationship between Mrs. Weill and her psychiatrist was a special

relationship of trust and confidence and consequently was a "sufficient predicate upon which to

e7
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find a misappropriation theory of liability.-r06 The court stated that "[i]t is difficult to imagine a
relationship that requires a higher degree of trust and confidence than the traditional relationship

ofphysician and patient."r07 The court also declared that a requirement for damages onthe part
ofthe party who suffered the misappropriation, although probative, is not required for liability to
attachlo8; "the one who misappropriates nonpublic information in breach

ofa fiduciary duty

and

trades on that information to his own advantage violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."r0e
Based upon the development of the misappropriation theory,

it is clear that the Courts

have implemented a case by case analysis in determining whether a special relationship of trust
or confidence existed to implicate the misappropriation theory. One of the biggest criticisms

for

the misappropriation theory was that there lies no bright line rule for determining the special

relationship of trust and confidence.tr0 The Secwities and Exchange Commission clarified the
law by adopting 10b-5-2.
10b-5-2 provides "a non-exclusive definition of circumstances in which a person has a

duty of trust or confidence for purposes ofthe misappropriation theory ofinsider trading under
Section 10(b) of the [Exchange] Act and Rule 10b-5,'rrr but it does specifu three situations
where trust and confidence always exist. The first relates to situations involving confidentiality
agreements, either written or

oral. "This reflects the cornmon-sense notion ... that reasonable

expectations of confidentiality, and conesponding duties, can be created by an agreement
between two parties."l12 Accordingly, to honor reasonable expectations, the misappropriation

theory will always apply to these situations. The second situation arises "whenever the person
tou
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communicating the material nonpublic information and the person to whom it is communicated
have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such that t}re recipient of the

information knows or reasonably should know that the person communicating the material
nonpublic information expects that the recipient will maintain its confidentiality."r

13

Finally the

third situation where a special relationship of trust and confidence is recognized is "whenever a
person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his or her spouse, parent, child,

or sibling."rra As a result of these provisions, the Commission has made it more efficient for the
courts to determine the special relationship requirement when applying the misappropriation
theory.
Through the above discussion ofthe legislative history of 10b-5, it can be seen that the
statute has evolved significantly from the early days of Ccdy through the later days of O'Hagan.

Insider trading is a continuing problem which demands continuing monitoring. The numerous
theories (i.e. classical insider theory, constructive insider theory, tipper/tippee liability, and the
misappropriation theory) that have been applied in interpreting and applying 10(b)(5) show
society's evolution in terms of its moral growth.

A Moral Critique of Insider Tradins Regulation
Conducting a moral analysis on Rule 10b-5 requires an initial selection ofa particular
moral theory. The moral theory selected will inevitably generate a result as to the moral

implications of a particular statute. Some of the more popular theories include Relativism,
Positivism, and Realism. Relativism is premised on the idea that there are no universal or
absolute truths. Because society is filled with unique cultures that exist all around the world,

relativists believe that truth depends upon culture and thus is ever changing with society.

tt'
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Positivism is premised on the narrow idea that truth is composed of a set of rules. Its central idea
is that "law and morals are separate and distinct realms." The positivists view law as a "science
and individual laws as the data or social facts whose validity depended only upon their existence
and not their

merit. Whether

a

law was moral or immoral is not within the province

of

jurisprudence."lls Realism rejects the positivists' premise ofthere being an "aggregation of
rules" and instead proclaims that the "rules are indeterminate until interpreted by ajudge or other
legal decision maker."r16 On the contrary natural law is premised on the idea that law and

morality are interconnected. "The common thread of natural law theories is the belief that reason
is the essence of law and the establishment ofjustice its primary frrnction. The ultimate

justification of

a

law is the extent to which it fosters both individual good and the common

good."t17 Natural Law theorist, John Finnis' Natural Law Natural Rights argues for "a morality
that is the product of the deep structure ofpractical thinking or moral thought."ll8 Itr the

following section, Finnis' moral analysis framework will be applied to Rule 10b-5, in particular
the misappropriation theory, which regulates insider trading.

In his opening John Finnis proclaims,
"There are human goods that can be secured only through the institutions ofhuman law, and requirements
ofpractical reasonableness that only those institutions can satisry. It is the object ofthis bookto identiry
those goods, and those requirements ofpractical reasonableness, and thus to show how and on what
conditions such institutions arejustified and the ways in which they can be (and often are) defective."rre

Hence the first question to ask when doing a Finnis moral analysis is whether, in this scenario,

Rule 10b-5 promotes the good. The first step in answering this question is to determine what
values are implicated by the statute. In terms of these values, Finnis lays out seven fundamental,
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basic universal goods. These goods are life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship,

religion, and practical reasorr.

t20

Finnis explains that each of these goods are "intrinsic goods

each worth having for their own sake, and not as a means of obtaining other goods"l2l-hence

they are not instrumental but frtndamental to each human being. Based upon exhaustive
anthropological studies, Finnis describes these fundamental values as being self-evidenr in
nature.

"All human societies show a concem for the value ofhuman life; in all, self-preservation is generally
accepted as a proper motive for action, and in none is the killing ofother human beings permitted without
some fairly definite justification. All human societies regard the procreation of a new human life as in
itself a good thing unless there are special circumstarces. No human society fails to restrict sexual activity;
in all societies there is some prohibition of incest, some opposition to boundless promiscuity and to rape,
some favor for stability and permanence in sexual relations. All human societies display a concern for
truth, through education ofthe young in matters not only practical but also speculative or theoretical.
Human beings, who can survive infancy only by nurture, live in or on the margins of some society which
invariably extends beyond the nuclear family, and all societies display a favor for the values ofcooperations, ofcommon over individual good, ofobligation between individuals, and ofjustice within
groups. All know frienclship. All have some conception oftitle or property, and ofreciprocity. All value
play, serous and formalized, or relaxed and recrealional. All teat the bodies ofdead members ofthe group
in some traditional and ritual fashion different from their procedures for rubbish disposal. All display a
concem for porvers or principles which are to be respected as suprahuman; in one form or another, religion
is

universal."'"

Finnis continues to remind us that
each

tJrese

universal goods are non-moral goods that are intrinsic to

individual. Morality is the product of practical reasonableness which will come into play in

the next section. The basic goods are those that are necessary for a human being to

flourish. We now examine which goods

fully

are at stake in Rule 10b-5, and in particular, the

misappropriation theory which is used to determine insider trading liability.

I.

Finnis' Basic Goods

as Associated to

Rule 10b-5

Life
"The term life signifies every aspect ofthe vitality of life which puts a human being in
good shape for self-determination. Thus it includes bodily (including cerebral) health, and
1'z0
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freedom from the pain that betokens organic malfunctioning or injury."r23 It is well known that
the stock market, although purely an economic activity, has a major effect on mental and
physical health. In a study conducted at Princeton University, researchers studied the mental and
physical health ofthose individuals who were moderately to highly invested in the market during
the crash

of2008.

The researchers found that due to the crash, the subjects were more likely to

encounter emotional and psychological problems which eventually would lead to physical
pain.I2a ln times of economic expansion tlese problems tend to be lower than during times

of

economic contraction. For example during the Great Depression, emotional problems leading to
suicide amongst individuals spiked 22.8Vo. On the other hand, the suicide rate decreased

significantly during the 1980s through 2000.r25
As discussed above, insider trading is not only unfair, but creates deficiencies in capital

allocation due to the imbalance of information amongst investors. This imbalance eventually
leads to a decrease in the quality of projects funded by organizations.

Like

a house

of cards,

eventually the decrease in the quality of projects causes the "whole house to collapse." When
this happens, the innocent investor becomes a victim due to the imbalance of information. When
the market crashes, emotional and physical problems amongst the victims arise leading some

heavily leveraged individuals to take tleir own lives. Rule 10b-5 recognizes people's lives are at
stake when insider trading is allowed to run

rampant-hence Finnis' basic good of life is of

interest in the statute regulating it.

rd, at 86.
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Knowledee
Knowledge is an intrinsic good that is considered to be desirable for its own sake and
not merely as something sought after, as an instrument, to obtain other goods. "Knowledge is
something good to have and being well informed and clear-headed is a good way to be."l26
"The value of truth is obvious and self-evident. It need not be and cannot be demonstrated. It is not innate
but becomes obvious only to one who has experienced the urge to question, who has grasp€d the
connection betwe€n question and answer, who understands that knowledge is constituted by correct
answers to particular questions, and who is aware ofthe possibility of further questions and other
questioners who like himself could enjoy the advantage ofattaining correct answers."r27

One of the values at stake in the creation of Rule l0b-5 is knowledge. Finnis says that

knowledge should be pursued for its own sake and should not be used instrumentally for
personal gain. Insider trading is in its essence a direct violation of this principle. Through
insider trading, investors are able to obtain sensitive information and directly profit from trading
upon

it.

The information attained is used directly for pecuniary gain. Hence because a direct

violation ofthe good of knowledge is at stake, 10b-5 serves as a remedial tool.
The stock market is the gauge of how the economy is doing as a

whole. It is premised on

accurate valuations ofthe companies listed. The stock price generally tells the investor all that is
needed to be known about the company in terms of its financial condition. Although investors

buy into the market for financial gain, the stock market affects behavior unrelated to an actual
investment made by an individual-this behavior includes an individual's general curiosity as to
how the overall economy is doing. When insider trading infiltrates the market, the gauge
becomes skewed. Hence when an individual becomes curious as to how the economy is doing

generally, the knowledge they seek is either inflated or deflated depending upon the extent ofthe

trading. Thus attaining knowledge for the

sake of knowledge becomes

futile, prohibiting the

flourishment ofthe individual. By leveling the playing field in terms ofknowledge available
126
127
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amongst investors, Rule 10b-5 seeks to uphold the integrity

ofthe market

as an accurate gauge

of

the health of the economy.

Plav
Play as a standalone has "its own value." Play involves "engaging in performances

which have no point beyond the performance itself, enjoyed for its own sake. The performance
may be solitary or social, intellectual or physical, strenuous or relaxed, highly structured or

relatively informal, conventional or ad hoc in its pattem"l28 "Play can enter into any human

activity" including in this instance, participating in the market.
"Playing the market" is a prevalent phrase in our society today. It can relate to an
investor, avid or sporadic, or a trader working for an institution involved in managing its clients'

money. In all of these instances, the notion of play cannot be divorced from the activity being
performed. For the investor, at a certain point, making a pecuniary gain becomes a byproduct to
the drive the individual gets fiom participating in a highly time-sensitive and unpredictable

market. This drive is obstructed when certain individuals play the market with sensitive
nonpublic information at the expense of others resulting in economic inefficiencies.
The obstruction is also seen when traders, who are hired by institutions solely on their

ability ofpicking the right investments, are unable to effectively do theirjob due to the
lopsidedness of information that insider trading promotes. Those that love what they do,
regardless ofthe paycheck they receive at the end of the week, are unable to utilize their skills
because of unfair advantages gained by others.

Insider trading directly attacks the notions ofplay and in tum fosters a sense of futility
amongst those participants listed above. Rule l0b-5 recognizes and attempts to remedy the

t'"

see Finnis, supra note 119, at 87.

deleterious effects the practice has on participants who engage in market participation for its own
sake.

Aesthetic Experience
Firuris explains that aesthetic experience, unlike play, "need not involve an action of
one's own; what is sought after and valued for its own sake may simply be the beautiful form
outside one, and the irmer experience ofappreciation of its beauty."

l2e

This e*perience can be

found in "the creation/and or active appreciation of some work of significant and satisfuing
form.'130 In this instance aesthetic experience, although not facially implicated, is at stake in the
context of insider trading.

All economists

are in agreement that market efficiency is the lynchpin of a successful

economy. Market effrciencies affect the economy which in tum affects all individuals-whether
they are market participants or non participants. According to Finnis then, market efficiency as a

whole is a work "of significant and satisfuing form" as it serves as the foundation to a full
functional economy. Those that participate in it only do so because of their appreciation for its

form. Nonparticipants also appreciate this form since economic repercussions implicate their
lives in one way or another. Insider trading, as discussed above, creates inefficient markets due
to its taxing effect on capital resource allocations. This inelficiency directly attacks the

satisfying form that investors and non investors appreciate. Thus, Rule 10b-5 recognizes
aesthetic experience as another value that is at stake and serves to remedy

it by placing strict

limitations.

Sociabilitv (Friendship)
Friendship, as Finnis explains, of "is the most intense form of community."

t'"
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sense offriendship, A is the friend ofB when A acts or is willing to act for B's well-being,
for the sake ofB, while (ii) B acts for A's well-being, for the sake ofA, (iii) each ofthem knows ofthe
othe6 activity and willingness and ofthe other's knowledge, and (iv) each ofthem coordinates his activity
with the activity ofthe other so that there is a sharing, community, mutuality, and r€ciprocity not only of
knowledge but also of activity."13r

"ln the fullest

Many friendship that are premised on business or "private need or advantage, or for play and
individual pleasure, ripen into relationships of intense friendship. In the insider trading context,
using Finnis' logic, a business relationship would never ripen into an intense friendship.
Friendship first requires an individual to act for the sake of another while also requiring each to
coordinate activity with the activity of the other "so that there is a sharing, community, mutuality
and reciprocity

ofnot only knowledge but also ofactivity."l32 Insider trading is premised on

making the most money as possible from nonpublic information. Therefore, the sharing

of

information is clearly out of the question since divulging information would do nothing but
decrease the insider trader's

retum-more people trading on the stock would mean

a decrease

in

overall profits. Therefore, those with business relationships with insider traders can never
develop true friendships since insider traders are more likely focused upon themselves and the
amount ofmoney they can make by hoarding sensitive information. Although not blatantly,

Rule 10b-5 subtly recognizes that fiiendship is a good that is at stake.

Religion
Religion ultimately represents one's joumey in discovering how orders engaged in
earthly life relate to the "order of the cosmos." Firuris asks, "does not one's own sense

of

responsibiliry, in choosing what one is to be and do, amount to a concem that is not reducible to
the concem to live, play, procreate, relate to others, and be intelligent?"l33 In regards to the
atheist, Finnis says the individual nonetheless appreciates that he is "responsible. . . in choosing

r3r
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what he is to be; and prior to any choice ofhis, recognizes that man is and is-to-be fiee."l3a This

recognition represents a concem for the "order of things beyond each and every one of us."lls
This concem, which "is a good consisting in an irreducibly distinct form oforder,"136 is

religious. The responsibility that we all have

as

individuals is at stake when insider trading is

allowed to run rampant. One of the main teachings of any religion is to be a good person and

perform honest work. Insider trading is a form of work that is not honest. Rule 10b-5 therefore
acknowledges this dishonesty and its nonconforming nature with that of the order of the cosmos.

Rule l0b-5 therefore recognizes religion as a value which is at stake.

Practical Reasonableness
The next good Finnis lists as a universal good is that of practical reasonableness. Finnis

explains that "there is the basic good ofbeing able to bring one's own intelligence to bear

effectively on the problems ofchoosing one's actions and lifestyle."l3T In its essence, practical
reasonableness is "participated in precisely by shaping one's participation in the other goods, by

guiding one's commitments, one's selection of projects, and what one does in carrying them
out."l38 Practical reasonableness aids us in determining which value to promote and which to
subordinate when two or more basic goods clash. Finnis has listed nine principles

of

reasonableness to determine whether a given path taken is reasonable. The moral analysis

of

Rule 10b-5, in relation to the misappropriation theory, will establish whether the action taken is a
reasonable solution to the problem of insider trading. Therefore this value

conjunction with the nine principles in the following section.
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will

be discussed in

II.

Finnis' Requirements of Practical Reasonableness in Relation To Rule 10b-5

All of the goods just described

are basic in themselves. "First each is equally self-

evidently a form of good. Secondly, none can be analytically reduced to being merely an aspect
of any of the others, or to being merely instrumental in the pursuit of any of the others. Thirdly
each one can reasonably be regarded as the most important.'l3e In this section how one can

of

determine the reasonableness ofchoosing a specific path is discussed. The nine principles

practical reasonableness discussed below express the natural law method of working out the

(moral) natural law from the first (pre-moral) principles of natural lawlao-the good is to be
promoted and evil is to be avoided. The nine principles of practical reasonableness, whose
product entails a moral judgment are: a coherent life plan, no arbitrary preferencas amongst
values, no arbitrary preferences amongst persons, detachment, commitrnent, the relevance
consequences, respect for every basic value in every act, the requirements
and following one's conscience.

of

ofthe common good,

l4l

A Coherenj Plan of Life
A coherent plan of life is one that "contains

a harmonious set

ofpurposes and

orientations, not as blueprints but as effective commitments."l42 Because deep commitments

don't have a specific schema" a coherent plan of life cannot be solely tailored to a specific

project. Although the plan "requires both direction and control of impulses and the undertaking
ofspecific projects, they also require the redirection ofinclinations, the reformation ofhabits, the
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abandonment of old and adoption ofnew projects, and overall the harmonization

ofall one's

deep commitments."la3

Rule 10b-5 was written in a very expansive manner containing an overall harmonization
ofCongress' plan to prohibit the use ofnonpublic information when buying or selling securities.
No blueprint is laid out, but a spirit of commitrnent in terms of promoting an anti-fraudulent
environment upon which investors could trade upon is highlighted. The misappropriation theory

currently is the doctrine used in establishing Rule 10b-5 liability for insider trading. But this
doctrine did not always govem the reach of 10b-5. As seen in the previous discussion, the
statute evolved in terms of its scope of

liability. The statute allowed for the "redirection of

inclinations and the reformation ofhabits" by having the ability to be construed broadly as time
went on and investors were able to circumvent the system. Because of the way the rule was

written along with its ability to evolve, Congress' plan of prohibiting insider trading through
Rule 10b-5 represents a coherent plan.
No Arbitrarv Preferences Amonsst Values
In making a rational decision, there must be "no leaving out of account, or arbitrary
discounting or exaggeration, of any ofthe basic human values."laa This decision will inevitably
focus on "one or some of the basic forms ofgood, at the expense, temporarily or permanently,

of

other forms of goods."r45 Nevertheless the highlighting and subordinating ofthese values cannot
be

"willy-nilly." In the insider trading context,

the "misappropriation theory holds that a person

commits fraud in connection with a securities transaction, and thereby violates $10(b) and Rule

l0b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in
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breach

ofa duty owed to the source ofthe information."la6 Although all ofthe basic goods

are

implicated, in one way or another, in determining liability based on the misappropriation theory,
some are highlighted while others are

not. The statute focuses mainly upon the basic goods of

life, knowledge, play, and reason.
As discussed above, life is taken into account by the statute since insider trading creates
deficiencies in capital allocation due to the imbalance of information amongst investors. This

inevitably affects the projects sought by an institution which ultimately affects the economy and
innocent investors. Because the economy is intertwined with emotional and physical problems
amongst the victims, leading some to take

tleir own lives, Rule

10b-5 recognizes that people's

lives are at stake without stringent regulation.
Knowledge is also taken into account by the statute in two ways. First, because
knowledge is to be pursued for its own sake and should not be used instrumentally for personal
gain, insider trading, in its essence, serves as a direct violation. The information that insiders
trade upon is solely motivated by pecuniary gains-knowledge therefore becomes an instrument

in attaining that gain. Secondly, the inefficiency created by insider trading adversely skews the
stock market which serves as a gauge on overall economic health. As a result, when an

individual becomes curious as to how the economy is doing generally, the knowledge they seek
is also skewed. Therefore, attaining knowledge for the sake ofknowledge becomes

futile. Rule

l0b-5 seeks to level the playing field in terms of knowledge available amongst investon,

so

that

the integrity of the market as an accurate gauge ofthe health ofthe economy can be upheld.

Finally, Play is taken into account by the statute to remedy the deleterious effects insider
trading has on participants who engage in the activity ofbuying and selling securities for its own
sake. Although the buying and selling in a market seems primarily pecuniary, for a lot
'ou
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investors it becomes a byproduct to the drive of actual participation in a highly time-sensitive
and unpredictable market. For employees of large institutions who trade as their occupation,
regardless of the amount of money they make, they are primarily motivated to use their skills

in

participating in the volatile market. The lopsidedness of information that results from inside
trading creates an unfair advantage directly attacking the notions of play and in tum fostering a
sense of

futility amongst those participants engaging in the activity. By imposing strict

limitations, the statute recognizes this basic form ofgood.
Although the statute is prcmised mainly upon the basic goods of life, knowledge, play,
and reason,

it does not arbitrarily prefer these over those that aren't premised upon it such as

aesthetic beauty, friendship or religion although they do play a minor

role. Commitment will be

rational only if it is on the basis ofone's assessment ofone's capacities, circumstances, and even
one's tastes. The four goods that are prefened here reflect most the circumstances that are
implicated by insider trading. Therefore, the plan discussed does not arbitrarily make
preferences amongst values.

No

Arbitrarv Preferences Amongst Persons
The third requirement of practical reasonableness is the "firndamental impartiality

amongst the human subjects who are partakers ofthose basic goods."laT Finnis explains that
there is room in this requirement for self-preference but it cannot be made through "selfishness,
special pleading, double standard, hypocrisy, indifference to the goods ofothers whom one could

easily help, and all the other manifold forms ofegoistic and group biases."la8
The interpretation of Rule 1 0b-5 through the misappropriation theory does not single out
a specific group when determining

147
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misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach ofa duty
owed to the source of the information. Because self-preference is one of the main motivations

for insider trading, fte statute seeks to subdue

it.

Based upon a reading of the statute and the

theory that is used to interpret it, no arbitrary preference amongst people is being shown. As

Finnis proclaims, "provided we make the distinctions between basic practical principles and
mere matters oftaste, inclination, ability, we are able to favor the basic forms ofgood and to

avoid and discourage their contraries. In doing so we are showing no improper favor to
..t49-

lndlvlduals...'-

Detachment and Commitment
Both detachment and commitment are needed to carry out a coherent life plan.
Detachment prevents both fanaticism and hopelessness amongst a particular project. "There is
no good reason to take up an attitude to any ofone's particular objectives, such that ifone's
project failed and one's objective eluded one, one would consider one's life drained

of

meaning."l5O "There are also evil consequences of succumbing to the temptation to give one
particular project the oveniding and unconditional significance which only a basic value and a
general commitment can

claim-these consequences relate to those that result

due to

fanaticism."rsr The balance between "fanaticism and apathy" thus is the "requirement that
having made one's general commitments one must not abandon them lightly...while also looking

for new and better ways of carrying out one's commitrnents rather than restricting one's horizon
to the methods which one is familiar."l52
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It has been established above that Rule 10b-5 represented what Firnis called a coherent

life plan. Based upon its history the Rule has been subject to nunerous interpretations in terms

ofthe scope of liability. Nowhere in its history

has the Rule been abandoned. Similarly,

nowhere in history has a single theory been stubbomly abided to without any room for further

interpretations. On the contrary the law has evolved in new and improved ways in associating

liability to those engaged in the practice of insider trading. From the days of classical insider
theory to the current misappropriation understanding of Rule 10b-5 it can be seen that the statute
served the balance between fanaticism and sheer hopelessness.

The (Limited) Relevance of Consequences: Efliciencv. Within Reason
The following requirement "brings about good in the world by actions that are efficient

for their purposes. One's actions should be judged by their effectiveness, by their fitness for
their purpose, by their utility, their consequences."ls3 Finnis reminds us that this isjust one
requirement though and that efficiency must also be balanced amongst the other principles

of

practical reason including the second principle which states that each basic good is equally

important and no arbitrary preference can be shown for one good over another. Thetefore,
seeking efficiency cannot be the sole factor in the decision making process.

Unlike

a

utilitarian point ofview (which Firuris believes is inational), Finnis believes that

"cost-benefit analysis be contained within a framework that excludes any project involving
certain intentional killings, frauds, etc."r5a But this "sphere ofproper application has limits, and
every attempt to make it the exclusive or supreme or even the central principle ofpractical

thinking is irrational and hence immoral."lss Because Rule 10b-5 is a project seeking to exclude
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fraud, a cost-benefit analysis can be used in determining the efficiency of the statute-but this
analysis cannot be the sole factor in the implementation ofthe regulation to justifr it as rational.
Insider trading results in an eventual inaccuracy in stock prices- As stated above, "when
companies raise capital at inaccurate prices, existing shareholders derive gains to the extent that

new investors overpay for their shares, and suffer losses to the extent that new investors
underpay."r56 The overpayrnent by new investors therefore is a central focus of insider trading

regulation. Because inside traders represent a significant minority within the market, the
majority of individuals are materially affected by their actions. Seeing this, aside from the
inherent unfaimess of an unleveled playing field, Rule 10b-5 was implemented to prohibit that

overpayment. Throughout its history though, insiders were able to circumvent the system
because

ofthe statute's reach. With the misappropriation theory though, it

difficult for these insiders to effectively circumvent the market. The result,

has become very
i

.e. benefits,

of the

regulation has made the market more representative as to its value where investors pay the true

worth of an investment. Although more regulation means more cost, the benefits of a market
which upholds its accurate value outweighs those costs and in tum makes Rule l0b-5 efficient

within reason.
Resnect For Everv Basic Value in Everv Act
This principle represents the idea that no decision can directly attack or destroy a basic
good, even though it may be subordinated.
"Reason requAes that every basic value be at least respected in each and every action. Ifone could ever
rightly choose a single act which itselfdamages and itselfdoes not promote some basic good, then one
could rightly choose whole programs and institutions and enterprises that themselves damage and do not
promote basic aspects ofhuman well-being for the sake oftheir net beneficial consequences."r5T

1s6
1s7

Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social costs of "lnaccurate" Stock Prices,41 Duke 1.J.977, 1006 (1992).
See Finnis, supra note L19, at 120.

Finnis explains that net beneficial consequences in themselves are "literally absurd general
objectives."l58 In the matter before us, Rule l0b-5 does not directly atlack any basic good.
Instead as previously discussed, each value is directly or indirectly promoted through its

implementation. Although some are focused more on while others aren't, each value is respected
and none are damaged.

The Requirements of the Common Good
This is the requirement of "favoring and fostering the common good ofone's

communities."l5e Finnis declares that the common good does not mean the "the greatest good
for the gteatest number" as preached in utilitarian doctrine. "There is a common good for human
beings, inasmuch life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, religion, and freedom in
practical reasonableness are good for any and every person."l60 "An ensemble of conditions

of

collaboration which enhance the well-being of all members of a community is the common
good."l6r
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the common good represent j ustice. "The

objective ofjustice is not equality but the common good, the flourishing

ofall

members

ofthe

community, and there is no reason to suppose that this flourishing ofall is enhanced by treating
everyone identically when distributing roles, opporn:nities, and resources."r62 This objective is

govemed by the principles of distributive justice which is made up offive criteria listed in order

of importance-need, function, capacity, merit, and who created the risk of
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harm.163

Determining need means determining whether given individuals in a society are taking
more than their fair share at

tie

expense of others. Need is the "fundamental component of the

common good."ls In the insider trading context, a few individuals reap profits based upon

information obtained wrongfully. These individuals, more likely than not, are those who are
higher up in society. Thus they are those which least likely need the benefits which they seek to

reap. Finnis carves out an exception by stating that "a few or even many may rightly be deprived
of much in order that those who can defend the whole community against its dangers may be
enabled and encouraged to do so."l65 In our scenario, this is deemed inapplicable as insider
traders serve no role in the protecting the community from any sort of danger imposed. On the

contrary, their circumventing the market actually poses a danger upon society in terms ofthe risk

of an eventual collapse.
The next element of distributive justice, function, represents "need relative not directly to
basic human good but to roles and responsibilities in the community."l66 In other words,

distribution based upon position. In this case, insider traders trade upon nonpublic information
for their own personal gain. The distribution here is one eamed through unfair means. Hence
position is irrelevant within this matter-the activity engaged in is not related to any tlpe of role
or responsibility the individual has within the community, but is only related to how well
connected the individual is and how timely the trades are made prior to information becoming

public knowledge.
The next criterion within distributive justice is capacity, which is "relative not only to

roles in communal enterprises but also to opportunities for individual advancement."r6T In other
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words capacity means benefits distributed upon the ability to be able to do something. In our
context, insider trading creates capital allocation inefficiencies which affect the overall market.
The adverse effect ofinsider trading in turn affects the ability of investors to individually achieve

their goals in market participation. Because insider trading is premised on new market
participants overpaying for a particular security, the practice a{fects innocent investors' capacity
to trade. Although inside traders may justify the benefits attained based upon their "skill" of

trading on nonpublic information, as compared to otler investors, they are not shouldering their
share

ofthe risk when investing to justifu receiving a greater share ofthe benefits.
The next criterion within distributive justice is that ofdistributions based upon merit.168

Those that are deserving, through their arduous efforts, in the end can
share of the

justify receiving a greater

benefits. ln our continuing context, insider trading is representative of attaining

information that no one else knows ofthrough suspect means and profiting from

it.

Nowhere is

merit involved within this context. On the contrary, insider trading deceives all other market
participants who are arduously studying market trends and economic conditions to determine
when the right time to buy or sell a particular investment is. Insider traders do not represent
those that are to be rewarded for their merit.
The last criterion within distributive iustice is a determination

ofwho created the risk of

harm.
costs and losses of communal enterprise fairness will often tum on whether some
parties hav€ created or at least foreseen and accepted avoidable risks while others have neither created them
nor had opportunity of foreseeing or ofavoiding or insuring against them"l6e

"ln the distdbution ofthe

Insider traders, as discussed above, create market inefhciencies by deriving gains to the extent
that new market participants overpay for their shares. Furthermore, tlle inside trading creates
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capital allocation problems which result in a decrease in the quality ofprojects funded by

institutions. This eventually leads to the overall decline in the economy. In this chain of events,

it is evident that the risk of harm is solely created by the insider trader. On the other hand, the
majority of investors have no protection against this practice, and instead are severely
disadvantaged. In the end, it would not be deemed just for the innocent investor to have to bear
the burden of a risk of loss created by the actions of the insider traders.
Based upon the five criterion listed above,

it is clear that the unequal distribution that

insider traders get is not just. Because it is not just, the act does not promote the common good.

Rule 10b-5 attempts to impose regulations upon this act so that a level playing field is provided
for all investors-in other words to make trading fair based upon public information. As such,
the statute promotes the common good.

Following One's Conscience
This final principle ofpractical reasonableness asks whether the action conforms in
accordance with one's conscience. In regards to mistaken conscience, Finnis relies on Thomas

Aquinas' formulation that
chooses to do what onejudges to be in the last analysis unreasonable, or ifone chooses not to do
what one judges to be in the last analysis required by reason, then one's choice is unreasonable no maner
how erroneous one'sjudgment ofconscienci may happen to be."l?o

"ifone

In the insider trading context, aside fiom the market inefficiencies and capital allocation issues
that arise, there seems to be a bigger wrong at stake. There is something fundamentally wrong

with someone gaining nonpublic information and trading upon it for

a

profit. Although

justifications can be made by the perpetrators, everyone knows that this is

a dishonest practice.

Regulations preventing this unfaimess conform to not only an individual's conscience, but that

of society. Ever since we were children, we have been taught to be honest in all aspects of our
170
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lives. lnsider trading directly violates this seemingly elementary principle. Hence regulating it
promotes the fundamental principles that are inherent within all ofour consciences.

The Product of These Requirements: Moralitv
Each

ofthe nine principles "plays

a part

in reasonable deciding" with regards to any act

or decision.
"Not every one ofthe nine requirements has a direct role in every moraljudgment, but some moral
judgments do sum up the bearing ofeach and all ofthe nine on the questions in hand, and every moral
judgment sums up the bearing of one or more of the requirements."' "

Based upon the nine principles examined in relation to Rule 10b-5 and the related

misappropriation theory used to determine the scope of liability for insider trading, it can be seen
that the regulations are appropriate means to achieve the good sought. The solution for insider
trading has a harmony ofpurposes, recognizes all of the basic goods, does not show arbitrariness
amongst individuals, is detached from particular realizations ofgood, has fidelity towards
commitments, is efficient in terms of its cost/benefit, respects every basic value, promotes the
common good, and conforms to one's conscience.lT2 Ba""d r.,pon adeep structure ofpractical

thinking which Finnis proposes, Rule 10b-5 and the corresponding misappropriation theory is
consistent with a practical reasonable approach in preventing insider trading'
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